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Mishnayos Sanhedrin Perek 9 Mishnah 2

סנהדרין פרק ט׳ משנה ב׳

2

If one intended to kill an animal, and he killed a person standing adjacent to it, or if he intended to kill a gentile, for whose murder he is not liable to be executed in court, and he killed a Jew, or if he intended to kill non-viable newborns, for whose murder one is not liable, and he killed a viable person, the assailant is exempt from execution, since his intent was to kill one for whose murder he is not liable. If one intended to strike another on his loins, and the blow was not powerful enough to kill him if it were to land on his loins, but instead the blow landed on his chest over the victim’s heart, and it was powerful enough to kill him when it landed on his chest over his heart, and the victim died as a result of the blow, the assailant is exempt from execution, as he did not intend to strike the victim a blow that would cause his death. If he intended to strike him on his chest over his heart and the blow was powerful enough to kill him were it to land on his chest over his heart, and instead the blow landed on his loins, and it was not powerful enough to kill him when it landed on his loins, and nevertheless the victim died, the assailant is exempt. Although the assailant intended to kill the victim, the blow was not powerful enough to kill. Ostensibly, his death was not a result of the blow. If one intended to kill an adult and the blow was not powerful enough to kill the adult, and instead the blow landed on a minor, and the blow was powerful enough to kill the minor and the minor died, the assailant is exempt. If one intended to kill a minor and the blow was powerful enough to kill a minor, and the blow landed on an adult and the blow was not powerful enough to kill the adult, and nevertheless, the adult died, the assailant is exempt. But if one intended to strike another on his loins, and the blow was powerful enough to kill him were it to land on his loins, and instead the blow landed on his chest over his heart, and he died, the assailant is liable, since in any event, his intent was to kill the victim and the blow was powerful enough to kill him wherever it struck him. If one intended to strike an adult and the blow was powerful enough to kill the adult, and the blow landed on a minor and he died, the assailant is liable. Rabbi Shimon says: Even if one intended to kill this one and he killed that one, although he would be liable for killing either, he is exempt, because one is executed only if his action completely corresponded with his intent.

נִתְכַּוֵּן לַהֲרֹג אֶת הַבְּהֵמָה וְהָרַג אֶת הָאָדָם, לַנָּכְרִי וְהָרַג אֶת יִשְׂרָאֵל, לִנְפָלִים, וְהָרַג בֶּן קְיָמָא, פָּטוּר. נִתְכַּוֵּן לְהַכּוֹתוֹ עַל מָתְנָיו וְלֹא הָיָה בָהּ כְּדֵי לְהָמִית עַל מָתְנָיו וְהָלְכָה לָהּ עַל לִבּוֹ וְהָיָה בָהּ כְּדֵי לְהָמִית עַל לִבּוֹ, וָמֵת, פָּטוּר. נִתְכַּוֵּן לְהַכּוֹתוֹ עַל לִבּוֹ וְהָיָה בָהּ כְּדֵי לְהָמִית עַל לִבּוֹ וְהָלְכָה לָהּ עַל מָתְנָיו וְלֹא הָיָה בָהּ כְּדֵי לְהָמִית עַל מָתְנָיו, וָמֵת, פָּטוּר. נִתְכַּוֵּן לְהַכּוֹת אֶת הַגָּדוֹל וְלֹא הָיָה בָהּ כְּדֵי לְהָמִית הַגָּדוֹל וְהָלְכָה לָהּ עַל הַקָּטָן וְהָיָה בָהּ כְּדֵי לְהָמִית אֶת הַקָּטָן, וָמֵת, פָּטוּר. נִתְכַּוֵּן לְהַכּוֹת אֶת הַקָּטָן וְהָיָה בָהּ כְּדֵי לְהָמִית אֶת הַקָּטָן וְהָלְכָה לָהּ עַל הַגָּדוֹל וְלֹא הָיָה בָהּ כְּדֵי לְהָמִית אֶת הַגָּדוֹל, וָמֵת, פָּטוּר. אֲבָל נִתְכַּוֵּן לְהַכּוֹת עַל מָתְנָיו וְהָיָה בָהּ כְּדֵי לְהָמִית עַל מָתְנָיו וְהָלְכָה לָהּ עַל לִבּוֹ, וָמֵת, חַיָּב. נִתְכַּוֵּן לְהַכּוֹת אֶת הַגָּדוֹל וְהָיָה בָהּ כְּדֵי לְהָמִית אֶת הַגָּדוֹל וְהָלְכָה לָהּ עַל הַקָּטָן, וָמֵת, חַיָּב. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר, אֲפִלּוּ נִתְכַּוֵּן לַהֲרֹג אֶת זֶה וְהָרַג אֶת זֶה, פָּטוּר:

ב׳
Bartenura

והיה בה כדי להמית על לבו ומת פטור – That both are necessary, that he intends to wound [to cause] death and also that they should stripe him a wound [to cause] death.

ר"ש אומר אפילו נתכוין להרוג את זה. – this does not refer to the end of the matter of the first Tanna, on that which the first Tanna [mentioned]– that he had the intention to wound the large individual but if it struck the small individual and he died, he is liable. For it is upon this that it refers, Rabbi Shimon exempts this person, is needed to be said, and why should he retract and explain that even if he intended to kill this one and killed that one, as the first Tanna explicitly stated this, what is the purpose of the word “even?” But, Rabbi Shimon is referring to the beginning – that if he intended to kill the animal and [instead] killed a person, he is exempt; but if he intended to kill a [particular] person but [instead] killed another person, he is liable. And on this, Rabbi Shimon comments – even if he intended to kill this one and killed [instead] that one, he is exempt. And the Halakha is according to Rabbi Shimon.

והיה בה כדי להמית על לבו ומת פטור. דתרתי בעינן, שיהא מתכוין למכת מיתה וגם שיכנו מכת מיתה:

ר״ש אומר אפילו נתכוין להרוג את זה. לאו אסיפא דמלתא דתנא קמא קאי, אהא דקאמר תנא קמא נתכוין להכות את הגדול והיה בה כדי להמית את הגדול והלכה על הקטן ומת חייב, דאי אהא קאי, רבי שמעון פוטר מיבעי ליה, ולמה ליה למהדר ולפרושי אפילו נתכוין להרוג את זה והרג את זה, הא בפירוש אמרו ת״ק, ומאי אפילו. אלא ר״ש ארישא קאי, נתכוין להרוג את הבהמה והרג את האדם פטור, הא נתכוין להרוג את האדם והרג אדם אחר חייב, ועלה קאמר ר״ש אפילו נתכוין להרוג את זה והרג את זה פטור. והלכה כרבי שמעון: